Industry Woes and State Law Limit New Orleans’ Wi-Fi

New Orleans’ hardest hit neighborhoods won’t be getting the wifi system it was promised.

According to an AP story available in print from the Advertiser, online from KATC, which is apparently based on an article from the Times-Picayune, Earthlink is pulling back from its commitment to expand it wifi network into the areas hardest hit by the levee breaches following Katrina. (See Earthlink’s current coverage area at right.—Click for a larger image.) That’s a blow to those who are fighting to rebuild their lives in the worst-hit areas. In the words of a local blogger who assessed the situation last year:

In a nutshell, if your neighborhood did not flood, then you have access to free WiFi, but if your neighborhood did flood, you’re out of luck. The city says the service will be free as long as the city is rebuilding, but the service is only available in places that didn’t flood, and hence don’t need to rebuild. I would argue that the flooded neighborhoods need the WiFi access more than anywhere else in America. For example, I won’t be able to get a phone line working in my house for years, and with information and building permits online, it would make much of the rebuilding process easier and safer.

Earthlink is a partner to the woes that have beset the concept of municipal wifi as a competitor to landline services; a problem that has recently been commented on here. Basically, offering wifi as alternative connectivity to the public based on advertising and subscriptions to higher level tiers has not worked out financially. Earthlink and other participants are demanding that the cities step up and guarantee their income by becoming “anchor tenants.” When you get right down to it that means is that the cities would guarantee the private concerns enough income to provide a secure basis for their making a profit. —It’s not a terrible deal since muni wifi offers a potentially large savings for all sorts of city services (from police, to fire, to emergency services, to meter readers, to code inspectors and more…) that are currently tied into expensive cellular services. Cities like Corpus Christi claim to have saved a bundle.

However the bottom line is that there is no denying that the new business plan of the private providers is for cities to guarantee their income with long-term fixed-cost contracts that guarantee an at least marginal profit for private providers.

But is subsidizing private profit a good deal for the cities? America’s cities, legally dependent on the states, and possessing no independent power, are perennially underfunded. New York, not long ago, almost went into bankruptcy. New Orleans couldn’t afford to rebuild something as basic as its sewer system before the storm. If the cities were allowed to build their own telecommunications systems the expense would easily be paid for from the savings to city services alone. Selling access to citizens would keep dollars in the city and help rebuild a crumbling income base whose erosion has kept city centers that are vital to our economic growth blighted and decaying.

Unfortunately, cities are seldom allowed the freedom to take care of themselves and their own citizens internally. The states have often, commonly at the behest of a single monopolistic outside corporation, effectively forbidden municipalities from providing their own telecommunications services.

That has happened to New Orleans.

New Orleans, long-term readers will recall, is a victim of Lousiana’s famous Muncipal (un)Fair Competition Act. New Orleans has already built a well-regarded municipal wifi system in the downtown area that provided for safety and police functions. When Katrina hit one of the success stories was that network which was quickly repurposed to provide wireless communications in a city where the private infrastructure had been wrecked. Volunteers, using materials generously donated by corporations, extended and upgraded the system in the initial days and months after the storm and the city opened up the network to citizens whose phone service and commercial connectivity was down. It was the feel-good story of the early days: hardworking, visionary local officials, in concert with a flood of talented volunteers, and the generosity of Americas’ telecom equipment providers, cobbled together a bright, shiny, new free muni wifi system—the first of the nation to go into operation.

That happy glow was not enough to save the system.

That Municipal (un)Fair Competiont Act forbids municipalities offering their citizens telecommunications services (wired, wireless, or carrier pigeon) that is in excess of 128 k unless they go through a complex, legally ambiguous battle, with the well-funded incumbents. The law was passed in response to Lafayette’s initial discussion of a retail Fiber To The Home network and was the incumbents first, nearly fatal blow to the project. As it was finally enacted even if a city succeeds it is still subject to a regulatory regime that does not apply to their private competition and which is enforced through an entirely new mechanism created to evade the state constitutions’ prohibition on regulating municipal utility functions. That regulatory regime is openly designed, not to protect the municipalities’ customers, but to protect their entrenched competition: it sets no upper limit on what muncipalities may charge, nor does enforce any quality assurance procedures. What it does do is set a lower limit on what a municipality may charge by insisting that the rate structures never show a loss and that “no loss” be defined in terms of what would be profitable if the municipality had to pay taxes to itself and other governmental agencies and pay itself for the use of its own poles and rights-of-way!

It is a thorough incumbent-protection act that stops just short of outright prohibition and does its best to make sure that even municipalities that win through to owning their own system will face unfair disadvantages during the operation of its telecommunications utility.

It is understandable that, in the wake of the storm and lead by a mayor who had once run the local Cox network, New Orleans would not choose to go through a long battle to keep its network when the emergency status that kept it legal expired. Instead they turned it over to Earthlink with the promise that Earthlink would expand the network into redeveloping areas and provide the leading edge of the spear in battle to reopen the flooded areas of the city. That won’t happen now.

The bright promise of a municipal network that would lead development instead of profiting off the struggling people of the city has, sadly, faded.

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The dark side of US federalism can be found in the way that its greatest cities, the engines of economic growth and the potential seat of political power, have been kept impoverished by state-level political resentments. New York and Philadelphia, for instance, have, like New Orleans, long been kept on a short leash by the states whose wealth and position of influence in the union depended upon them. The rise of a unified city electorate that distrusts state power and hangs together in support of even unsavory local political machines is as much an indictment of how the cities have been treated by “upstate” politicians and their resentful constituencies as any ‘innate’ urban corruption. There is perhaps no better example of this dynamic than Louisiana where cosmopolitan, Catholic, liberal, and yes “chocolate,” New Orleans with its fleshpots, Creoles, Mardi Gras, and French traditions remained leashed to a state whose political engines were controlled by those who were offended by most of what made the city great.

The state’s people, organized by their local communities, should pursue the complete repeal of the law that keeps New Orleans from taking care of itself. Lafayette, the original target of this malign law, who has won through to having its own fiber network, is now morally obligated to lead the way.

Eatel Plays Telco Game

I’ve lauded EATel repeatedly, both for its locally-owned fiber to the home project and for its (lost, lamented) inexpensive phone service.

But fair is fair. EATel has apparently decided that its role as a rural incumbent phone company should allow it to act like the big boys. Like AT&T everywhere little EATel is balking at cutting the same “serve the whole community if you want to use our rights-of-way” deal with the village of Sorrento that any other cable company would have to cut. From the Advocate story:

Town Attorney Greg Lambert told the council at its meeting Tuesday that Cox Communications, currently the only provider in the area, asked that Eatel be held to the same agreement provisions as Cox.

Lambert said Eatel has agreed to all of the same provisions except the density requirement, which requires Cox to provide service to any house within 300 feet of a distribution system, and any area that has 50 residences within one cable mile or 10 residences within a quarter of a cable mile.

Sharon Kleinpeter, a vice president at Cox Communications, told the council that Eatel and Cox should operate under the same standards.

A broken clock is right twice a day and Kleinpeter and Cox are right about this. And I was wrong to think EATel too local and loyal to try and run such a scam — though I was right to think that the Sorrento Council would resist. [It should be noted that there is more than a whiff of hypocrisy about Cox’s objections: Cox’s late endorsement of the state-wide video franchise that BellSouth/AT&T proposed came about when they were included in the list of companies that could ignore a local community’s demand of service for all citizens in return for the use of those citizen’s property. Cox would have been wiser not to encourage the competion to cherry-pick then; they’d be more credible now.]

EATel already has to run its copper into every home and has been profiting off the people of Sorrento for generations…it is resisting upgrading a few people who have been loyal customers to marginally increase their overall profit in a new market.

Emulating AT&T is not the way to go for a progressive local firm whose greatest asset is the belief that it is more likely to care about the local community than outside monopolies. Stuff like this squanders their core advantage and is lousy business even if it weren’t unethical.

For shame.

Let’s hope the Sorrento Council holds firm and returns EATel to its better self.

“Sorrento might OK Eatel fiber”

Sorrento is about to get a locally-owned fiber-optic network. Rural telephone provider Eatel, who Lafayette readers may remember fondly as one of the businesses that used to offer cheap phone service here, is now bidding to extend its fiber-optic network to the town.

EATel, no longer known as East Ascension TELephone, is based in the parish of the same name and is bidding to extend cable and high-speed internet service to this town in its already-existing footprint.

From the Advocate story:

The Town Council has agreed to consider a proposed ordinance that, if adopted, would provide residents with a choice of cable television providers.

“Basically, it will allow Eatel to run fiber-optic lines to provide cable services. Eatel will provide a competing service to Cox (Communications),” town attorney Greg Lambert said.

That’s good news for local consumers. Sorrento is lucky that its phone provider is Eatel and not AT&T.

Eatel is doing what AT&T refuses to do—actually competing against the cable company in small rural towns. And Eatel is doing so on a level playing field, paying the town of Sorrento franchise fees to use its property equal to those Cox pays. One assumes that there is no question but that Eatel will serve the whole town; the phone company network is everywhere and city council in a small town like that would get hung if it signed anything that allowed partial service. BellSouth/AT&T realizes that local representatives feel that way—and since they would rather serve the rich guys they went to the Louisiana legislature to get a law passed that would have forbidden a town like Sorrento from demanding that a franchisee that wanted to use the public rights-of-way would have to serve both sides of the track. (Blanco vetoed the bill.)

Good for Eatel. Good for Sorrento.

Cox to build Broussard’s WiFi?

There’s interesting by-play being reported in the Advertiser today. The town of Broussard, just south of Lafayette is set to renew its cable franchise with Cox….and install a government-use WiFi system there. Anybody besides me think this is the opening move in a years-long chess match between LUS and Cox in Lafayette Parish and Acadiana? From the short story:

The cable company has agreed to provide the city with wireless Internet for the police and fire departments and city administration. “We’ll pay a nominal fee for the service,” said Mayor Charles Langlinais shortly after the March 28 City Council meeting. “Whether they expand city-wide will be dependent on them.”
One point under negotiation has been the fact that the company is not required to provide service in rural areas, unless there are at least 40 residents per linear mile, Langlinais said.
Langlinais recommended lowering the number to 25 per mile, which he estimated will provide the opportunity for cable to most residents of the Broussard area.

There are at least three pieces of context that a reader should take into account.

  1. Cox does not, anywhere to my knowledge, do municipal wi-fi.
  2. Langlinais has been a very vocal supporter of the LUS project and
  3. Broussard has talked about putting up its own wi-fi system; a system which would have run afoul of the anti-Lafayette “Local Government Fair Competition Act.”

Juxtaposing those three reveals a nexus of conflicting interests and local politics. What’s going on? What are the interests of Cox, the city of Broussard, and local citizens?

Cox:
Why would Cox offer a totally new service to a small town in south-central Louisiana? In doing this Cox is substantially adding to the list of things a local community can demand in its franchise agreements. Every city wants wifi. The cachet of being a wireless city is being pursued by cities ranging from tier 1 cities like Philadelphia and San Francisco to tiny places like Chaska, Minnesota. The idea that just any little city can forgo all the pain of building its own wireless net or enticing a commercial entry with tax funds, tax givebacks, or exclusive contracts in order to get them to do so is just stunning. If Broussard can just attach wi-fi to its franchise agreement upon renewal why can’t anyone? This is a big deal–perhaps a bigger deal nationally than it will be locally.

That Cox is willing to go this far reveals some things: This offer reveals that Cox takes widely-speculated-on elements LUS’ expansion very seriously and feels compelled to respond.

  1. They believe that LUS will build a wi-fi network as part of its fiber-opitc build. (I am confident they are right—but no such announcement has been issued.)
  2. They believe that LUS is poised to extend its retail telecom presence into the parish outside its traditional city footprint. (I think they are right—but no such announcement has been made.)
  3. They are terrified that the addition of wireless services will give LUS a large advantage. So large that they believe that Cox can’t afford not to respond with a preemptive product of its own even if it has to offer it out of sequence with its national plans. (Which, they have hinted, will someday include their own wireless product.)

As a consequence they are willing to use Broussard to place a roadblock to LUS’ expansion to the south even at some risk to its larger corporate interests. The City of Broussard won’t be available as an anchor tenant on any LUS system.

I won’t be shocked if Cox tries to launch such a system in Lafayette proper. But I will be surprised. Competing with LUS’ wireless system will be very hard: LUS will be running off a dense fiber network and that will enable it to run a system that will be as far ahead of other wifi networks as its FTTH system will be ahead of other wired competitors. I expect 30 times the bandwidth provisioning of conventional muni wifi networks. Entering into competition with that could be embarrassing.

Broussard & Langlinais
If Cox’s interests are clear, so are Broussard’s—and Langlinais’.

Municipal wifi is almost universally a mayoral project. Securing a major, new, hot, “visionary” service for its citizens (at no cost) has got to look good to any mayor.

That aside, Broussard is, I strongly suspect, playing a smart game with its franchise agreement. Typically municipalities have NO leverage come franchise renewal time. In the normal course of events the cable company knows that there is no practical chance a competitor will enter the fray and give local citizens choices. Given its practical monopoly status, no city council will dare endanger their citizen’s cable television shows. (You think potholes are a big local issue? Try disturbing a man’s Sunday afternoon football game. Or access to Opra. NO way.)

But Broussard has managed to get city-wide wifi (with a “possibility” of residential access). That alone is an amazing feat. Broussard is also negotiating with Cox for an expansion of its build-out. Changing from a density requirement of 40 per linear mile to one of 25 might not sound impressive to some. Such folks might want to take a good look a map of Broussard. Broussard—much more than any of the other communities surrounding Lafayette—has incorporated huge swaths of rural land with only the spottiest development. Some large tracts have no development at all. Changing this requirement will mean that many new areas will get service (and you can bet Mayor Langlinais knows just who should be grateful). Nation-wide the phone companies are driving hard to eliminate municipal franchising precisely so they won’t have to serve all parts of the community; especially poor and sparsely settled areas. Cable companies have mostly been going along, asking only for an equal ability to not serve whoever they don’t think will yield a large profit. What is not on the table is increasing build-out requirements during franchise re-negotiations.

Should this plan go through Broussard will have pulled of an almost unimaginable coup, getting governmental wifi, a potential retail wifi network, AND forcing Cox to serve a greater portion of its citizens. For this Langlinais and Broussard will owe the citizens of Lafayette who have created a credible competitive alternative to the local Cox cable TV monopoly a vote of thanks. (Eatel’s competition, those with long memories may note, did the citizens of East Ascension a similar favor.)

Citizens
So the citizens of Broussard are in for what looks like a really good deal. At least in the short run. And for as long as neither the Feds nor the state of Louisiana succeed in stripping franchising power from local governments. But the citizens should be going down to the city council and asking some hard questions. Questions which will determine whether this short-term treat is a long-term good deal. I suggest starting with:

  1. How long will the new contract run? How long is the city locked into Cox as its wireless provider?
  2. Will Cox’s system have mobile capacity? (A huge advantage for police and firefighters.)
  3. How robust will the system be? (LUS’ will be huge–potentially running at 30 megs, a speed unheard of in muni wifi.)
  4. Is there any exclusivity element in the wifi agreement? Can others come in and compete?
  5. Does the city have any influence on what Cox charges its citizens in return for use of city-owned poles and rights-of-way?
  6. Is there any revenue sharing on the retail wifi end in return for the use of city property–as there is for Cox’s cable TV product?
  7. Just how “nominal” is the nominal cost for governmental services?
  8. Will citizens be allowed to access the system while on city property–say while doing research at city hall?

One question about LUS’ system is absolutely put to rest by this development. I’ve heard people ask what possible benefit LUS’ fiber-optic network will be to the rest of the parish. I’ve not heard this as much since LUS ran fiber to every school in the parish. But this development shows what an astounding benefit the tonic of even the threat of a little competition can bring to surrounding communities.

AT&T & Cox should reconsider state video franchising

Tis spring and the legislative season is opening in these United States. Our Louisiana silly season won’t begin ’til April but many state legislatures are already in session. An article in the Jackson, TN newspaper reminds us that phone companies are still up to their old tricks. Last year the telephone companies launched a nation-wide push in state legislatures to take control of local rights-of-way away from the cities and counties that own them and create state-level privileges for phone companies who wanted to get int the cable TV business.

Background
Most important of these privileges was state permission to avoid the build-out requirements of towns and cities-local governments that have, for pretty obvious reasons, consistently insisted that if a business wanted to use local property to make a profit off its citizens then offering service to all the citizens was a non-negotiable starting point. “All of us or none” was the stalwart principle. In various places the phone companies have conceded to every other demand from monetary rewards to PEG channels. But they are not willing to give up the competitive advantage over the cable companies of skimming off the cream of the local market. They want to take the most profitable customers and move on with no assurance that their “competition” will ever reach most of the community.

Our legislature fell for it and only the governor’s veto pen kept the state from writing into law a bill that would have solidified the digital divide between poor and rich as well as between rural and urban for at least a generation. (In fairness to individual legislators, it should be said that there was a truly inspirational confrontation on the floor of the Senate. Friends of the people went down kicking.)

On the evidence of what is going on elsewhere this season in places like Tennesse, Wisconson, and it seems likely that Louisiana will again see an attempt by AT&T to ram through a state-wide video law that favors its interests. While AT&T (then BS) found tough sledding early in last season’s attempt to pass such a law after partnering up with Cox and the cablecos they managed to pass a law fairly easily. The new, cableco-approved version would have allowed cable companies to break their contracts with local communities in order to use the same advantages offered the phone companies. The cable companies apparently thought that, on the balance, the new advantages over communities was a decent trade-off for the benefits the bill gave the phone companies in their competition with cable. (Did that dark alliance clue in the legislative majority? No.)

So I expect the AT&T-BS/Cable coalition to be back at the trough this year. With the FCC rule that gave the phone companies most of what they failed to get from the last congress now in jepordy from a resurgent Congress there is no reason to think that the incumbents won’t continue to try and get what they want from the local yokels they’ve taken before.

But whoa up a moment: is that really wise?
Things change. That article from the Tennessee paper contains a suggestive paragraph:

One advantage of the state legislation, however, is that Jackson Energy Authority [JEA] would be able to expand its cable and Internet services outside of its present designated service area, Farmer said.

JEA is Jackson’s equivalent of LUS–the fiber-laying, incumbent-slaying upstart. Incumbents take heed: Lafayette’s own muni fiber optic network is now assured. EATel, the locally owned rural phone company, is building its own fiber network on line between New Orleans and Baton Rouge and has made clear its ambitions for expansion from the beginning. St. Charles parish is contemplating building its own network and looks to Lafayette. Rumors about New Orleans Fiber In The Sewers (FITS) continues to make the incumbents slumber fitful. It’s beginning to look like a trend.

Any and all of these entities could take advantage of the same (still unfair) privileges that for which AT&T/BS has been angling.

That’s not what BellSouth intended. When that law was originally proposed NOBODY that could compete with BellSouth would have benefited. The late inclusion of the cable companies didn’t really change the competitive landscape much. They are already built out as much as they think profitable, new challenges from them were unlikely.

AT&T/BS might want to rethink its position in Louisiana. They’ll be enabling folks who might (gasp!) actually decide to compete with them–and compete at their own game with superior technologies. If the phone company succeeds legislatively what is to keep EATel from deciding to serve, with real fiber, the new mushroom ring around New Orleans–but only the wealthier new suburbs, the local cream, and doing to AT&T what it plans to do to the cable companies: cherry-pick the most profitable areas and leave the rest for the incumbent providers. What’s to keep St. Charles from doing its own network with support from Lafayette’s backend facilities–right down to using LUS’ billing and branding systems? What’s to keep LUS from aggressively moving into every non-incorporated new subdivision in the parish using its now-pervasive fiber backbone that feeds the schools? What’s to keep LUS from being invited into cities as full competitors in places that like what they see happening in Lafayette? With a state-wide franchise: Nothing, Nothing, Nothing, and Nothing.

No doubt LUS, as a municipal entity itself, will not be willing to move into a city without negotiating with the local authorities and sharing income. But that might be a big advantage in the long run. If AT&T really manages to come in, cherry pick the cream, and stiff the cities on income and services it will be a painful, ugly thing as cities take the hit in franchise income. (The cable franchise is usually 3-5% of gross revenues–a critical component of local discretionary revenues.) LUS (and similar entities its example may spawn) wouldn’t have to extract nearly the profit the incumbent desire and could afford to be generous with services and profit-sharing. That could prove very attractive to places abused by the incumbents inevitable move to squeeze the municipalities once the cities are stripped of bargaining power by state or federal takings.

Maybe AT&T will still think the advantages it gains over cable are worth the competition it courts by promoting a law that will give every small public or private entity in the state a license to compete in every corner of the state on an ad hoc basis. Maybe. But a year later it is clear that the decision is no longer a no-brainer with nothing but upside for the company. As the old saying goes: Be careful what you wish for.

Cox’s (and the other cableco’s) rationale for backing AT&T’s law this time around is even less clear than it was last year. The emerging pattern of AT&T predatory build out policies in other states (predicted here at LPF) is now obvious: they take the best and leave the rest for the cable companies who have already built their networks to serve the entire community and have to carry that extra overhead.

Cox Baton Rouge, which now includes Acadiana, is particularly vulnerable: On the south it faces EATel, a local phone company which makes no bones about it desire to bring its FTTH-based cable competition to rapidly growing–and lucrative arc of outer suburbs developing south and east of Baton Rouge. That ambition was spoken before the storms devastated New Orleans and made those areas the new home to much of the population of that metropolis. Should EATel secure that arc it’d be posed to eat into the densely populated segments of the city–but not with AT&T’s barely capable DSL-based offerings but with full throated fiber to the home. On the Western verge of that territory it is now certain that Cox’s largest profit center in Acadiana, Lafayette, will be a profit center no longer. Inevitably LUS’ expansion will come out of Cox’s established base; with few exceptions every cable customer LUS gets will mean a lost subscriber for Cox. That nightmare is visible on the horizon. In short order Lafayette will be one of the least profitable networks in its system, supported by a subscriber base that is a fraction of what headquarters has grown to expect.

No, Cox does not need to add to its troubles by supporting a law written by its deadliest enemy.

Cox has allied with the wrong side. Here’s what would be much smarter: Ally with the Louisiana Municipal Association and the parishes. Join them in suggesting a pre-emptive law that protects local rights and keeps AT&T/BellSouth from securing unfair competitive advantages.

The outlines of such a law aren’t hard to see and could be based on a law suggested by local governments last year. That law offered to put a 90 day “stop clock” on any negotiation with a new competitor, assuring that no one could be unreasonably delayed in entering a new market. If an agreement couldn’t be reached quickly all the competitor had to do was agree to sign on to the same contract the incumbent cable company already had. Easy, fast, efficient, and transparently fair. It was, of course, rejected out of hand by the phone company. Their interest lay in securing advantage, not a level playing field.

This year’s version could look like this, for starters:

  • It should be based on the current local franchise; preserving local control of local resources.
  • It could lay out a reasonable timeline for a full build-out to match the current cable footprint. Small communities could expect to be served by a full competitor in three years and larger cities in, say, seven. That would remove the most anti-competitive aspect of the law, and the one that puts the established incumbent at a permanent disadvantage.
  • It could include a time clock (the cities are willing to agree to 90 days) after which the default “established contract” goes into effect–that would mean no long delays of the sort the phone companies claim to be worried about.
  • The default contract could include certain standard modifications such as: a “revenue neutral” clause for the city; meaning that the extras, like PEG monies, channels, service networks and the like would only have to be provided once…not twice. This could include a clause allowing the new entrant to pay the current provider for providing their pro-rata-by-subscriber share of these services or allow them to take over a portion of the responsibility directly as they expand and acquire the capacity.
  • Also standard could be clauses that provide real, automatic, penalties for not meeting contract requirements like one mandating buildout. To make sure that both cities and competitors are motivated to insist on contract adherence the default contract could have escalator clauses built into the monies paid the city and the incumbent if they failed to meet their promise to compete fully and fairly.

It would make a lot of sense for Cox and the state cable association to get together with the municipal and parish organizations and promote a bill that protects their rights and competitive interests while giving the phone company the quick and easy route to competition that they claimed they wanted last year.

“Cable Confronts Bandwidth Crunch”

Light Reading reports that cable’s technical guys are beginning to get antsy about bandwidth. This is news since cable in the US has had such a clear technical advantage in the bandwidth arena over their phone fella competitors that bandwidth has been something cable guys crow over–not something they worry about.

Shaking off two years of disbelief and dismay, the cable industry has finally started dealing with the prospect of an impending bandwidth shortage.
Cable operators and equipment suppliers, alarmed by an explosion in bandwidth use by cable subscribers over the last couple of years, are now drawing up plans to boost capacity at both the headend and plant levels. Instead of debating whether the coming bandwidth crisis is genuine, they’re looking at ways to confront the crisis…

Verizon’s running fiber to the home has changed that equation that gave cable unquestioned superiority, giving one phone fella the clear advantage in potential bandwidth over all cable. And, more importantly the customer is changing. Usually all you get from industry reps and executives is the party line. What’s nice about this story is that the author talks to the tech guys at the SCTE conference. The upside is that you don’t hear the usual pablum. The downside, of course, is that just because the tech guys think there is a problem don’t mean the marketing ones do…and proverbially, its’ the marketing types that end up running the company. While the tech guys tend to worry about how to meet a demand they see growing, the marketers have to ask if there is any reason to do so.

And in markets that confront Verizon’s fiber–or homegrown alternatives like Lafayette’s Fiber for the Future or Utah’s Utopia–they do.

The issue seems to be video, video, and yet more video. HDTV takes more bandwidth than standard TV, Video on demand eats bandwidth, IPTV demands upgrades, and Downloaded Video (DV!) turns out to consume bandwidth pretty wildly. Tellingly, the tech guys don’t try and make scapegoats out of point to point technologies like the spokesfolks do. The real issue is the enormous size of video files and the bandwidth expense of providing them on a one-to-one basis instead of “broadcasting” them in streams. And the only solution is more bandwith. Even including the ultimate solution:

They’re even weighing such previously unthinkable moves as building fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) networks and adopting PON architecture, just like some of the big phone companies.

That’s news, but that’s also distant…while technicians instinctively go to the best, most permanent solution the cable guys know that they’ve got plenty of alternatives short of that. The cable plant is capable of adapting to the need in several ways but the question is, always, at what capital cost and at what cost to altering the basic business plan.

The issue of the cable’s underlying and, frankly, outdated, business plan is a real one. Cable inherits and depends on a model born in the old network period of television–a time of three networks, half hour shows, rigid schedules, and free-to-the-viewer advertising support. Cable has been instrumental in destroying the rationale for such a model — and has never ceased to benefit from presumed scarcity it assumes. They managed to get folks to accept that they’d see advertising on 200 channels of mediocre media they paid for but did not choose (a tough sell!) but it remains to be seen whether they can similarly contain the contradiction of offering a rigidly packaged product that they profit from multiple times (cable TV) beside a product that potentially cuts them out of content cash flow (the data flow of the internet).

I’ve made the claim that you ought to prefer DV (downloadable video) and this story provides a piece of evidence that the hoped for transition may be occurring—and that for cable companies the experience will be painful.

Knorr, whose cable system serves a major college town, said he’s already seeing early signs that younger consumers are opting for Internet video downloads over traditional cable video service. In Lawrence, home to the University of Kansas, 5,000 of the cable system’s 40,000 subscribers only take high-speed data service. These subscribers account for a sizable 20 percent of the system’s cable modem customers.
“Customers are using the Internet more hours per day,” he said. “There’s an absolute risk of people dropping basic video service for Internet video.”

Since selling video service is THE business that cable companies are in and its profitability accounts for cable’s comfortable position in the business world the idea that they’d have to trade that cushy, near-monopoly business for selling easily commodified bandwidth. There’s much less room for profit, and much more competitive uncertainty in that market. If you check out Knorr’s site, Sunflower Cable, you’ll find that the small cableco is “courting” this problem by offering very affordable 1o meg downloads in a student town! (At the same price point, more or less as expanded basic cable.) Locally, Cox doesn’t even offer a 10 meg alternative and the only other cablecos that do, to my knowledge, are in the northeast corridor where they compete with Verizion.

Pretty clearly, at 10 megs sophisticated users will perceive that they have a choice…and if they decide to invest in internet services instead of another 100 channels of cable the cablecos bottom line — and their business model — will suffer.

Lafayette

But all that is a general analysis; what does the video wave mean for a local place like Lafayette? Well there are parallels: LUS is our local equivalent of Verizon; it is willing to offer serious competition that will technically out-class the cable competition. It will have video bandwidth to spare as DV becomes the dominant force and the market starts to reform around assumptions that favor download and hence bandwidth. (If content providers, or LUS, choose to locate servers on-system users will be able to download at 100 megs, magnifying its advantage.)

Cox’s system can probably stay in the game–if it is willing to make local upgrades in response and run Lafayette’s system on a business model that imitates LUS’s advantages. But that would be a different model from the one that it uses everywhere else. That strategy would put them playing catch-up with a leader whose network resources are superior but with the advantages of being the video incumbent to slow down its market erosion. To draw even in capacity would require FTTH. I personally doubt Cox is willing or capable of making those local adaptations. I was surprised when they joined Baton Rouge and Lafayette regional systems, coordinating channels, pricing, and network architectures. That move makes adapting to a very different competitive environment in Lafayette unwieldy or even impossible without a re-separation. (Note: Cox Baton Rouge also faces local fiber in the guise of East Ascension parish’s EATel. But that local phone company does not yet threaten to overbuild into prime Cox territory the way that LUS does.) Cox is also heavily in debt through a combination of expensive acquisitions and an even more exhausting expense of taking itself private. It seems unlikely to have the free capital to do really expensive network upgrades at this time. Cox is lucky that its footprint most often overlaps that of AT&T/BS–a company with a similar debt burden.

AT&T nee BellSouth will be the also-ran here, struggling to offer a pale imitation of the two leaders’ vide products with a less capable network, me-too content, and not enough bandwidth to offer new, differentiating product categories. A purely local response to LUS is even less likely than with Cox and they are similarly weighed down with debt.

The video wave that the cable guys see coming boils down pretty simply to bandwidth. The full competitive situation, both nationally and locally will involve a plethora of other issues, including the power of incumbency, local trust, and the ability and willingness to integrate new wireless services. The outcome won’t be determined solely by technical prowess.

We live in interesting times.

Municipal Campaign Strategy; Learning from Lafayette

So what did we all learn from the battle of Lafayette? I’ve been asked recently and have been thinking about it some…What follows is a first draft which focuses pretty much on the active strategies of the two sides as I see it. —It’s about what they tried to accomplish and where they wanted the conversation to go. This ignores some interesting larger factors (like trust in the mayor, or the relaxed southern Lousiana attitude toward government, or Lafayette’s peculiar ways of organizing influence, for instance) that could be considered important but background factors. It also mostly ignores the tactical questions–how the strategies were enacted–that are some of the more interesting things to come out of this fight. Instead this is a more birds-eye view of what, it seems to me, both sides might have learned from Lafayette’s fight for fiber.

First off, it’s pretty apparent that the incumbents don’t have much new up their sleeves. The campaign they waged here mirrored campaigns they’ve waged in the past. We didn’t see the as dramatic a finish as we saw in the Tri-Cities but that may well have been because the battle was already lost for BellSouth and Cox before the end arrived. But that doesn’t mean that their basic idea about what makes for an effective campaign has changed: the basic strategy of sowing fear, uncertainty, and doubt seems pretty constant. The tactics seemed to involve a lot of replays as well…Push polls were used here, albeit pretty counter effectively. We got two last minute overexcited direct mail focusing on false claims about taxes, the repeatedly disproven idea that all municipal broadband (or even most) is failing, and silliness about the debt families are supposedly taken. Too, as in the Tri-Cities, an editorial writer who played a prominent role in the opposition was taken to task for unseemly involvement with the incumbents or their allies. The tactics were mostly retreads; what was different was that the predictable campaign was not fronted entirely by the incumbents themselves but, especially in the last days by their allies at Fiber 411.

One of the things the incumbents learned here was that long campaigns are bad for them. Given time, and an aggressive willingness to fight back, lies can be disproved, push polls turned to outrage, and promoting fear and insulting the intelligence of the locals begins to sour any possible relationship with the community. In Lafayette the fight went on for too long. The incumbents had to trot out their best weapons too early and pro-fiber partisans were able to correctly label them as FUD and drive home the message that the incumbents were not being truthful—a message that inoculated the public against further last minute lies.

Unfortunately, I think the incumbents also learned that, saved to the last minute, and promoted through a local proxy, their FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) approach can still be effective. I agree with Don’s analysis that the last minute mailers, the full page ads that simply reprinted a (non)local editorialist’s massively inaccurate take and automated phone calling about a new fantasy “debt” issue were effective. They were simply not effective enough. The local pro-fiber groups kept up a dogged insistence, even during the incumbents’ quietest moments, that the incumbents and their allies were not truthful. Radio time remained filled with a recut version of the push poll and Lafayette Coming Together (LCT) was relentless in pushing the issue. LCG and LUS, while toning down this message near the end and moving it away from the Terry and Joey, never fully abandoned it.

What the pro-municipal fiber forces learned was probably more valuable: that they can win. The overwhelming economic power of the incumbents can be blunted. Their willingness to leave accuracy and truthfulness aside in the pursuit of their own interests can be turned against them. What it takes is something that most municipal officials will not have the stomach for: a full throated attack on some of the most powerful corporations in their city. Telephone corporations have a long history of being the most “generous” investors in state election campaigns and the most powerful lobbying force in state legislatures. Cable companies control what politicians understand to be the most powerful media in town. Lafayette was willing to fight with a strong local and populist message that clearly labeled its opposition as “greedy” “out-of-state” “monopolies.” The spectacle of our Mayor and the head of the utility system “standing up” for Lafayette in a press conference after every bit of misinformation spread by the incumbents and being uncompromising in calling them on each and every false claims was crucial to the campaign. Driving home the message that the incumbents self-interest and greed was driving this process was invaluable in resisting the final onslaught.

There is little doubt that Lafayette had advantages that might not be available in all locales. The bravery of the leadership and its willingness to call a monopoly, a monopoly and greed, greed has already been noted and was tremendously important. There was also a determined, deliberately broad-based coalition of citizens that made it hard to paint the project as one fostered by wealthy technocrats. The coalition group, Lafayette Coming Together, was also quite sophisticated about the use of both old and new media. But the greatest advantage was a pride of place born out of a realistic belief that the region, and Lafayette as the heart of that region, is unique and not subject to rules imposed on us by outsiders. It mixture of cultures, its cultural identities, and the ways the people have found to sustain their cultures make it very difficult for outsiders to successfully come in and infer that the locals are incompetent or successfully introduce effective divisive tactics. (One of the more despicable strategies, used all the way through and culminating in simple lies on Black radio near the end, was to try and split the Creole and black communities away from the rest of the community by using historical resentments which had nothing to do with the issue at hand. Without the aid of community leaders this attempt did not take hold. But the attempt is destined to be one of the longest remembered stains on the campaign of the incumbents and their allies.) Most communities have never had to develop that sort of resilience in the face of outside disapproval but the communities of Acadiana are very good at dismissing outsiders.

Other considerations that helped support a victory in Lafayette appear to be a result of market and national policy worries of the incumbents. Fights like the one in the Tri-Cities can be considered Pyrrych victories—the cost was high, not necessarily in terms of money, but in terms of their reputation both locally and nationally. The cable and telephone companies simply are regional monopolies in their core business and maintaining a favorable regulatory relations at the state level and franchise agreements at the local level depend upon their being perceived as good, or at least benign, local citizens. It will surely take a decade or more to regain that status in the Tri-Cities; even voters who succumbed to the arguments of the incumbents could not help but notice the fear-based tactics that were used to bring them along. There was no large federal issue ongoing at the time of the fight in Illinois. But major initiatives of both the Cable and the Phone companies are before statehouses and more importantly, the Congress. The centrally important 1996 telecom act is up for revision this legislative season, in but one example. An ugly, high-profile attack on Lafayette when the defenders were willing to fight back by identifying the incumbent corporations as “greedy monopolists” may well have been too much to stomach for those at corporate central who felt they had bigger fish to fry and to much to lose to risk that sort of battle in a single small city.

Finally there is the basic market motivation: too much bad behavior damages the bottom line–if you lose. Surely BellSouth and Cox had done their own polling and could read the writing on the wall as well as anyone. The referendum was going to succeed and p0lling no doubt showed that the first reaction of the population to a new round of misinformation would turn more people against them than it gained. If there was any doubt about that the swift and overwhelmingly hostile reaction to the second push poll this summer proved the point that the usual incumbent tactics had become counter-productive. The hard truth was that BellSouth and Cox still had to compete in Lafayette and a loss in a full scale assault would have immediately pushed the likely “take rate” among voters past 5o% percent if corporate behavior turned a “Yes” vote into a vote against Cox and BellSouth. Working through proxies and saving the mail pieces and scare phoning until the end when they could not be answered might well have been all that can be done without damaging their market position by turning the referendum into a marketing tool for LUS.

Lafayette’s battle deserves, I believe, to be seen as one model for regaining local control of crucial monopoly infrastructure. The underlying populist message of local self-determination and legitimate anger toward regional monopolies like BellSouth and Cox was what drove the winning argument in Lafayette. People saw nothing wrong with building for themselves a network that the incumbents refused to build for them. Similarly, people do understand that these companies are monopolies whose bottom line has nothing to do with what is best for the communities across the country in which they reside. That is the core upon which electoral success was built. Lafayettes’ leadership, her aware citizens’ group, a committed ‘old Lafayette’ leadership, and the way her cultural distinctiveness played out made the message relatively easy to develop and denied the opposition virtually all local assets. Other communities might not share those particular advantages but the anti-incumbent message that can win has now been established and future communities can sharpen the message and develop their own resources.

Lafayette can be proud to have developed a winning model and strategy—not without help of course, but with plenty of verve. It will be up to our successors to sharpen the tool and make it more generally useful.

Higher costs due to BellSouth’s law

The Advocate story, LUS to receive draft of PSC pricing rules, gives background for a set of draft rules the Louisiana Public Service Commission (PSC) is expected to issue this week.

The regulation is a result of language in BellSouth’s misnamed “Local Government Fair Competition” Act (Act 736) passed last summer as a compromise to the original BellSouth bill which would have made Lafayette’s fiber-optic project impossible.

The story, while well-written, tends to be a little confusing in part because of necessary technical language such as “in-lieu-of-taxes” and “cross-subsidizaton,” and in part because the concepts seem a little off. I think I can help clarify the matter by giving a little context. You need to clear your mind of the usual assumption that the PSC exists to ensure fairness for consumers and citizens—to make sure that rates are no higher than they must be. Act 736 is not about that. It is about ensuring “fairness” (cough, cough) for telecom corporations–by which the framers of the law (uh, BellSouth) meant that municipal providers should labor under any burden that they do and a number of burdens that no private corporation would ever tolerate. The purpose of this segment of the law is to artificially raise the cost to consumers and citizens above that which they would have to pay were there no such “fair” law.

Ok, stop for a minute and wrap your head around that. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that you pay higher rates than you would otherwise. And the PSC is supposed to enforce it (don’t you know they hate this). Once you have this Alice in Wonderland concept firmly fixed in your mind the story makes a lot better sense.

Ready? Good. Let’s jump down the rabbit-hole.

One part of the regulations that we will see in draft form this week is that which results from the Act 736 requirement that the PSC make sure that rates to customers are set higher than the actual cost of LUS doing business. This requirement is supposed to account for taxes and fees that LUS doesn’t have to pay because it is a public body or because it already owns the rights of ways for which the fees are paid. (Honestly. That is really the logic of it.) LUS managed, as part of the compromise, to get its contribution to the city government (in-lieu-of-taxes) counted against this requirement. As it turns out, the in-lieu payment is already greater than all the taxes and fees that private providers have to pay, regardless of what sob stories we often hear from telecom corporations. But still, the PSC has to set up elaborate regulations–and LUS has to spend money to track of all this–so that the PSC can confirm that LUS is not saving its customers too much money.

Now if that isn’t strange enough, in addition to asking LUS to charge you for taxes it doesn’t pay and fees to use property it already owns, Act 736 also requires that the PSC impose conditions on LUS that no private business has to endure. The basic idea is that LUS should have to pretend that the new business is not a part of LUS and charge itself accordingly. Private businesses normally start new divisions and enterprises in areas in which their current resources make them better able to compete efficiently. That’s just common sense. You’d think. But in the world in which Act 736 forces the PSC to exist, it is illegal–for public entities. So there will be a “cost allocation manual” that controls what percentage of the work on a pole is assigned to the telecom division and how much to power. There’ll be “affiliate transactions” regulations that mandate that LUS charge open rate for work folks in the power division or sewer divisions do for LUS. There will be endless red tape to prove that they are doing these inefficient things. To what end? Well, to hear BellSouth tell it, to prevent the evils of “cross-subsidization,” which apparently is a bad thing when a public power company uses its resources to support telecom services but a good thing when a telecom company uses its immense technical resources and broadband backbone to muscle into the wireless business. (Cingular anyone?) “Cross-subsidization” is good, fundamental business practice and an important way in which the free enterprise system develops efficiencies to pass on to consumers and enrich owners. There is absolutely nothing wrong with the idea. Except when the efficiencies are earned by BellSouth’s competitors.

The truth is that the real purpose of these regulations is to force unnecessary inefficiencies and costs onto the telecom division. And the purpose of that is to make sure that LUS cannot bring your rates down as low as it would otherwise be able to do.

So, friends and neighbors, the coming rate hearings are not only an inscrutable bureaucratic nightmare, they will also determine just how much how much savings our utility will be allowed to pass on to us and how much phantom inefficiency it (and no private provider) will have to carry on its books when it comes time to determine the rates the PSC allows it to charge you. We will discover just how much BellSouth’s law will cost the consumers of Lafayette. It’s all more interesting than you think.