AT&T & Cox should reconsider state video franchising

Tis spring and the legislative season is opening in these United States. Our Louisiana silly season won’t begin ’til April but many state legislatures are already in session. An article in the Jackson, TN newspaper reminds us that phone companies are still up to their old tricks. Last year the telephone companies launched a nation-wide push in state legislatures to take control of local rights-of-way away from the cities and counties that own them and create state-level privileges for phone companies who wanted to get int the cable TV business.

Background
Most important of these privileges was state permission to avoid the build-out requirements of towns and cities-local governments that have, for pretty obvious reasons, consistently insisted that if a business wanted to use local property to make a profit off its citizens then offering service to all the citizens was a non-negotiable starting point. “All of us or none” was the stalwart principle. In various places the phone companies have conceded to every other demand from monetary rewards to PEG channels. But they are not willing to give up the competitive advantage over the cable companies of skimming off the cream of the local market. They want to take the most profitable customers and move on with no assurance that their “competition” will ever reach most of the community.

Our legislature fell for it and only the governor’s veto pen kept the state from writing into law a bill that would have solidified the digital divide between poor and rich as well as between rural and urban for at least a generation. (In fairness to individual legislators, it should be said that there was a truly inspirational confrontation on the floor of the Senate. Friends of the people went down kicking.)

On the evidence of what is going on elsewhere this season in places like Tennesse, Wisconson, and it seems likely that Louisiana will again see an attempt by AT&T to ram through a state-wide video law that favors its interests. While AT&T (then BS) found tough sledding early in last season’s attempt to pass such a law after partnering up with Cox and the cablecos they managed to pass a law fairly easily. The new, cableco-approved version would have allowed cable companies to break their contracts with local communities in order to use the same advantages offered the phone companies. The cable companies apparently thought that, on the balance, the new advantages over communities was a decent trade-off for the benefits the bill gave the phone companies in their competition with cable. (Did that dark alliance clue in the legislative majority? No.)

So I expect the AT&T-BS/Cable coalition to be back at the trough this year. With the FCC rule that gave the phone companies most of what they failed to get from the last congress now in jepordy from a resurgent Congress there is no reason to think that the incumbents won’t continue to try and get what they want from the local yokels they’ve taken before.

But whoa up a moment: is that really wise?
Things change. That article from the Tennessee paper contains a suggestive paragraph:

One advantage of the state legislation, however, is that Jackson Energy Authority [JEA] would be able to expand its cable and Internet services outside of its present designated service area, Farmer said.

JEA is Jackson’s equivalent of LUS–the fiber-laying, incumbent-slaying upstart. Incumbents take heed: Lafayette’s own muni fiber optic network is now assured. EATel, the locally owned rural phone company, is building its own fiber network on line between New Orleans and Baton Rouge and has made clear its ambitions for expansion from the beginning. St. Charles parish is contemplating building its own network and looks to Lafayette. Rumors about New Orleans Fiber In The Sewers (FITS) continues to make the incumbents slumber fitful. It’s beginning to look like a trend.

Any and all of these entities could take advantage of the same (still unfair) privileges that for which AT&T/BS has been angling.

That’s not what BellSouth intended. When that law was originally proposed NOBODY that could compete with BellSouth would have benefited. The late inclusion of the cable companies didn’t really change the competitive landscape much. They are already built out as much as they think profitable, new challenges from them were unlikely.

AT&T/BS might want to rethink its position in Louisiana. They’ll be enabling folks who might (gasp!) actually decide to compete with them–and compete at their own game with superior technologies. If the phone company succeeds legislatively what is to keep EATel from deciding to serve, with real fiber, the new mushroom ring around New Orleans–but only the wealthier new suburbs, the local cream, and doing to AT&T what it plans to do to the cable companies: cherry-pick the most profitable areas and leave the rest for the incumbent providers. What’s to keep St. Charles from doing its own network with support from Lafayette’s backend facilities–right down to using LUS’ billing and branding systems? What’s to keep LUS from aggressively moving into every non-incorporated new subdivision in the parish using its now-pervasive fiber backbone that feeds the schools? What’s to keep LUS from being invited into cities as full competitors in places that like what they see happening in Lafayette? With a state-wide franchise: Nothing, Nothing, Nothing, and Nothing.

No doubt LUS, as a municipal entity itself, will not be willing to move into a city without negotiating with the local authorities and sharing income. But that might be a big advantage in the long run. If AT&T really manages to come in, cherry pick the cream, and stiff the cities on income and services it will be a painful, ugly thing as cities take the hit in franchise income. (The cable franchise is usually 3-5% of gross revenues–a critical component of local discretionary revenues.) LUS (and similar entities its example may spawn) wouldn’t have to extract nearly the profit the incumbent desire and could afford to be generous with services and profit-sharing. That could prove very attractive to places abused by the incumbents inevitable move to squeeze the municipalities once the cities are stripped of bargaining power by state or federal takings.

Maybe AT&T will still think the advantages it gains over cable are worth the competition it courts by promoting a law that will give every small public or private entity in the state a license to compete in every corner of the state on an ad hoc basis. Maybe. But a year later it is clear that the decision is no longer a no-brainer with nothing but upside for the company. As the old saying goes: Be careful what you wish for.

Cox’s (and the other cableco’s) rationale for backing AT&T’s law this time around is even less clear than it was last year. The emerging pattern of AT&T predatory build out policies in other states (predicted here at LPF) is now obvious: they take the best and leave the rest for the cable companies who have already built their networks to serve the entire community and have to carry that extra overhead.

Cox Baton Rouge, which now includes Acadiana, is particularly vulnerable: On the south it faces EATel, a local phone company which makes no bones about it desire to bring its FTTH-based cable competition to rapidly growing–and lucrative arc of outer suburbs developing south and east of Baton Rouge. That ambition was spoken before the storms devastated New Orleans and made those areas the new home to much of the population of that metropolis. Should EATel secure that arc it’d be posed to eat into the densely populated segments of the city–but not with AT&T’s barely capable DSL-based offerings but with full throated fiber to the home. On the Western verge of that territory it is now certain that Cox’s largest profit center in Acadiana, Lafayette, will be a profit center no longer. Inevitably LUS’ expansion will come out of Cox’s established base; with few exceptions every cable customer LUS gets will mean a lost subscriber for Cox. That nightmare is visible on the horizon. In short order Lafayette will be one of the least profitable networks in its system, supported by a subscriber base that is a fraction of what headquarters has grown to expect.

No, Cox does not need to add to its troubles by supporting a law written by its deadliest enemy.

Cox has allied with the wrong side. Here’s what would be much smarter: Ally with the Louisiana Municipal Association and the parishes. Join them in suggesting a pre-emptive law that protects local rights and keeps AT&T/BellSouth from securing unfair competitive advantages.

The outlines of such a law aren’t hard to see and could be based on a law suggested by local governments last year. That law offered to put a 90 day “stop clock” on any negotiation with a new competitor, assuring that no one could be unreasonably delayed in entering a new market. If an agreement couldn’t be reached quickly all the competitor had to do was agree to sign on to the same contract the incumbent cable company already had. Easy, fast, efficient, and transparently fair. It was, of course, rejected out of hand by the phone company. Their interest lay in securing advantage, not a level playing field.

This year’s version could look like this, for starters:

  • It should be based on the current local franchise; preserving local control of local resources.
  • It could lay out a reasonable timeline for a full build-out to match the current cable footprint. Small communities could expect to be served by a full competitor in three years and larger cities in, say, seven. That would remove the most anti-competitive aspect of the law, and the one that puts the established incumbent at a permanent disadvantage.
  • It could include a time clock (the cities are willing to agree to 90 days) after which the default “established contract” goes into effect–that would mean no long delays of the sort the phone companies claim to be worried about.
  • The default contract could include certain standard modifications such as: a “revenue neutral” clause for the city; meaning that the extras, like PEG monies, channels, service networks and the like would only have to be provided once…not twice. This could include a clause allowing the new entrant to pay the current provider for providing their pro-rata-by-subscriber share of these services or allow them to take over a portion of the responsibility directly as they expand and acquire the capacity.
  • Also standard could be clauses that provide real, automatic, penalties for not meeting contract requirements like one mandating buildout. To make sure that both cities and competitors are motivated to insist on contract adherence the default contract could have escalator clauses built into the monies paid the city and the incumbent if they failed to meet their promise to compete fully and fairly.

It would make a lot of sense for Cox and the state cable association to get together with the municipal and parish organizations and promote a bill that protects their rights and competitive interests while giving the phone company the quick and easy route to competition that they claimed they wanted last year.

Food For Thought: LUS’ Wireless RFP

A little more than a week ago I posted a piece about LUS’ Wireless RFP (request for proposals) and asked a few questions. Since no one else answered them I decided to go down to City Hall and pick up a copy for myself.

For those who might have missed the story, LUS put out a call for proposals to supply what was described as a wireless network for LUS and city use. No mention of public access was made, though locals familiar with the way that the LUS fiber project evolved from purely utility purposes are reasonably hopeful that a wireless network will evolve in the same way.

The RFP itself is pretty simple as such things go and you have to think that bidders will need to request further specifications. But there is enough there take a stab at answer the questions I asked earlier.

Note: this is an 802.11 “WiFi” mesh network. That’s the same architecture that is being used in metro wireless installations from Philadelphia to San Francisco. For the technically inclined: the hardware standard described involves two radios operating in two different bands. Specifically, the equivalent of Tropos’ most advanced access points, and its software, is specified. (Tropos is the market leader in metro WiFi.)

1. Does it include a very strong backbone “supply” element?

  • Yes, It is hung directly off LUS’s current fiber ring. –It will not be crippled by running off a wireline supply source that has less capacity than it is able to use. (The expense of providing for adequate “backhaul”–and sometimes the ability to find such at any price has been a major limiting factor in most public muni WiFi efforts.)

2. Are upgrade “hooks” part of the proposed deal?

  • Yes, the request makes it clear that there will be at least a “phase 2” (official protestations aside) and that proposal should take into account the networks eventual expansion to full coverage of the 45 square miles of the city. The access point model specified is the first of a new generation from its maker and future models in the family are promised to be interoperable with these and to support emerging technology and standards like MIMO and WiMax and older standards like public safety.

3. Does it assume ubiquitous fiber?

  • Hmmn…well maybe or at least implicitly. Nothing beyond the first layer, “phase 1” is specified. But assuming that what is described for phase 1 sets the pattern for the future it looks like the plan is to make full use of the fiber. Wireless mesh networks are built around ratios between aggregation access points that are connected to backhaul networks and simple mesh network which are only connected to other access points via wireless. Common acceptable ratios are 5 or 6 mesh nodes per aggregation point. All too many systems are using larger ratios and putting up with the resulting performance issues. A gold-plated system would use a slightly smaller number. The ratio LUS is suggesting for phase 1 is 1:1.3. That is astonishingly low and only makes sense where the wireless owner also owns the backhaul network (in our case fiber). Other users would have to pay per drop for their microwave, WiMax, T1, fiber link, or the like and such per drop costs would run up the expenses very quickly. Maintaining such a low ratio would mean deploying a system of pretty astonishing capacity. While policy might limit the bandwidth allowed, nothing in the network itself limit network speeds. They could conceivably run at near the rated speed of 802.11 protocols that underpin it–currently about 54 megs.

4. Does it use owned spectrum for local backhaul? Or open? Or fiber?

  • Fiber. This is certifiably yummy. See above.

5. Does it use open spectrum for the final connection?

  • Yes. This is a “good thing,” for it means that a multitude of low-cost hardware will be able to access the network. Proprietary spectrum has some advantages for local governments and, generally, some is available to it for various safety functions but such networks cannot be practically be opened for public use.

6. What technologies are specified….WiFi, WiMax, etc…?

  • WiFi is specified. The suggested hardware is software upgradeable.

7. What applications are supported; either explicitly or through the specification of indicative standards?

  • Support for a wide range of applications including surveillance video, voice, data, mobile communications-seamless roaming, VPN, and meter reading are in the specs.

Long story short: There is nothing here that would impede using this as the core of a very capable public wireless network. Caveat: there is no particular reason for me to assume that it will be — beyond sheer desire and my own belief that a wireless component will be necessary in the coming competition with AT&T/BS and Cox.

“Cable Confronts Bandwidth Crunch”

Light Reading reports that cable’s technical guys are beginning to get antsy about bandwidth. This is news since cable in the US has had such a clear technical advantage in the bandwidth arena over their phone fella competitors that bandwidth has been something cable guys crow over–not something they worry about.

Shaking off two years of disbelief and dismay, the cable industry has finally started dealing with the prospect of an impending bandwidth shortage.
Cable operators and equipment suppliers, alarmed by an explosion in bandwidth use by cable subscribers over the last couple of years, are now drawing up plans to boost capacity at both the headend and plant levels. Instead of debating whether the coming bandwidth crisis is genuine, they’re looking at ways to confront the crisis…

Verizon’s running fiber to the home has changed that equation that gave cable unquestioned superiority, giving one phone fella the clear advantage in potential bandwidth over all cable. And, more importantly the customer is changing. Usually all you get from industry reps and executives is the party line. What’s nice about this story is that the author talks to the tech guys at the SCTE conference. The upside is that you don’t hear the usual pablum. The downside, of course, is that just because the tech guys think there is a problem don’t mean the marketing ones do…and proverbially, its’ the marketing types that end up running the company. While the tech guys tend to worry about how to meet a demand they see growing, the marketers have to ask if there is any reason to do so.

And in markets that confront Verizon’s fiber–or homegrown alternatives like Lafayette’s Fiber for the Future or Utah’s Utopia–they do.

The issue seems to be video, video, and yet more video. HDTV takes more bandwidth than standard TV, Video on demand eats bandwidth, IPTV demands upgrades, and Downloaded Video (DV!) turns out to consume bandwidth pretty wildly. Tellingly, the tech guys don’t try and make scapegoats out of point to point technologies like the spokesfolks do. The real issue is the enormous size of video files and the bandwidth expense of providing them on a one-to-one basis instead of “broadcasting” them in streams. And the only solution is more bandwith. Even including the ultimate solution:

They’re even weighing such previously unthinkable moves as building fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) networks and adopting PON architecture, just like some of the big phone companies.

That’s news, but that’s also distant…while technicians instinctively go to the best, most permanent solution the cable guys know that they’ve got plenty of alternatives short of that. The cable plant is capable of adapting to the need in several ways but the question is, always, at what capital cost and at what cost to altering the basic business plan.

The issue of the cable’s underlying and, frankly, outdated, business plan is a real one. Cable inherits and depends on a model born in the old network period of television–a time of three networks, half hour shows, rigid schedules, and free-to-the-viewer advertising support. Cable has been instrumental in destroying the rationale for such a model — and has never ceased to benefit from presumed scarcity it assumes. They managed to get folks to accept that they’d see advertising on 200 channels of mediocre media they paid for but did not choose (a tough sell!) but it remains to be seen whether they can similarly contain the contradiction of offering a rigidly packaged product that they profit from multiple times (cable TV) beside a product that potentially cuts them out of content cash flow (the data flow of the internet).

I’ve made the claim that you ought to prefer DV (downloadable video) and this story provides a piece of evidence that the hoped for transition may be occurring—and that for cable companies the experience will be painful.

Knorr, whose cable system serves a major college town, said he’s already seeing early signs that younger consumers are opting for Internet video downloads over traditional cable video service. In Lawrence, home to the University of Kansas, 5,000 of the cable system’s 40,000 subscribers only take high-speed data service. These subscribers account for a sizable 20 percent of the system’s cable modem customers.
“Customers are using the Internet more hours per day,” he said. “There’s an absolute risk of people dropping basic video service for Internet video.”

Since selling video service is THE business that cable companies are in and its profitability accounts for cable’s comfortable position in the business world the idea that they’d have to trade that cushy, near-monopoly business for selling easily commodified bandwidth. There’s much less room for profit, and much more competitive uncertainty in that market. If you check out Knorr’s site, Sunflower Cable, you’ll find that the small cableco is “courting” this problem by offering very affordable 1o meg downloads in a student town! (At the same price point, more or less as expanded basic cable.) Locally, Cox doesn’t even offer a 10 meg alternative and the only other cablecos that do, to my knowledge, are in the northeast corridor where they compete with Verizion.

Pretty clearly, at 10 megs sophisticated users will perceive that they have a choice…and if they decide to invest in internet services instead of another 100 channels of cable the cablecos bottom line — and their business model — will suffer.

Lafayette

But all that is a general analysis; what does the video wave mean for a local place like Lafayette? Well there are parallels: LUS is our local equivalent of Verizon; it is willing to offer serious competition that will technically out-class the cable competition. It will have video bandwidth to spare as DV becomes the dominant force and the market starts to reform around assumptions that favor download and hence bandwidth. (If content providers, or LUS, choose to locate servers on-system users will be able to download at 100 megs, magnifying its advantage.)

Cox’s system can probably stay in the game–if it is willing to make local upgrades in response and run Lafayette’s system on a business model that imitates LUS’s advantages. But that would be a different model from the one that it uses everywhere else. That strategy would put them playing catch-up with a leader whose network resources are superior but with the advantages of being the video incumbent to slow down its market erosion. To draw even in capacity would require FTTH. I personally doubt Cox is willing or capable of making those local adaptations. I was surprised when they joined Baton Rouge and Lafayette regional systems, coordinating channels, pricing, and network architectures. That move makes adapting to a very different competitive environment in Lafayette unwieldy or even impossible without a re-separation. (Note: Cox Baton Rouge also faces local fiber in the guise of East Ascension parish’s EATel. But that local phone company does not yet threaten to overbuild into prime Cox territory the way that LUS does.) Cox is also heavily in debt through a combination of expensive acquisitions and an even more exhausting expense of taking itself private. It seems unlikely to have the free capital to do really expensive network upgrades at this time. Cox is lucky that its footprint most often overlaps that of AT&T/BS–a company with a similar debt burden.

AT&T nee BellSouth will be the also-ran here, struggling to offer a pale imitation of the two leaders’ vide products with a less capable network, me-too content, and not enough bandwidth to offer new, differentiating product categories. A purely local response to LUS is even less likely than with Cox and they are similarly weighed down with debt.

The video wave that the cable guys see coming boils down pretty simply to bandwidth. The full competitive situation, both nationally and locally will involve a plethora of other issues, including the power of incumbency, local trust, and the ability and willingness to integrate new wireless services. The outcome won’t be determined solely by technical prowess.

We live in interesting times.

On Killing the Goose that Lays the Golden Egg

The Advocate carries the odd story, splashed across the front page of its Acadiana section this morning, that retells the tale one Steve Pellessier told the Concerned Citizens for Good Government yesterday. Pellessier wants Lafayette to sell off LUS to pay for current shortfalls in road funding.

Thank heaven that at least some folks have a classical education. Joey Durel responded humorously but basically dismissively to the suggestion by saying that do so would be like getting “rid of the goose that laid the golden egg.”

The idea of selling off a consistent money-maker, to the tune of 17.2 million and a quarter of the city-parish budget each year, for a one-shot, quick fix play to meet the parish’s road needs following Katrina & Rita is plain foolish. It has to be one of the purest examples of the lessons of Aesop’s fable concerning “the destructiveness of greed, the virtue of patience.”

First, historically LUS has had lower prices than its private competitors (the current rough equity is unusual) and Pellessier appears to know that. Citizens would end up paying twice: once in the form of 25% higher taxes–the money has to come from somewhere–and once in the form of higher utility bills. Second, and this point appears to have very discretely not been raised considering the current divisiveness of the issue in the council, it would be a sale of city assets to benefit almost solely suburban needs and the downstream cost of more expensive electricity would be borne solely by city residents as well. Politically this should be a major nonstarter. The current push to dissolve the city-parish form of government is mostly based on formless resentment. Any movement in this direct would give that movement a basis in real injustice and a real constituency.

Beyond the foolishness of the idea of killing the goose you’ve got the fact that this goose is fertile. The goose in the fable is obviously sterile–it lays golden eggs but those eggs don’t hatch. It is unique. LUS however is incubating another goose that promises to lay even larger golden eggs. The mere threat of an LUS Telecom network has kept Cox from raising prices. The reality of a cheaper, more capable alternative will save us all a bundle off our monthly bills.

Beyond the cost savings we should all be aware that the income to the city-parish coffers should be substantial. That 17.2 million LUS gives us comes chiefly from electricity…a low-margin utility. The money coming into the coffers from the Telecom division will mostly be from high-margin cable industry competition. How much do you spend on electricity? How much do you spend on cable, internet, and phone service? Think about it…

If there is anything that’s more foolish than killing the goose that laid the golden egg it’s killing one that has offspring that also lay golden eggs.

Though the Advocate story doesn’t mention it Pellessier, in a recent letter, did say that LUS could keep its recently voted-in telecom division. That’s a crock and Pellessier, an opponent of the LUS plan, should know it. Much of what makes the telecom unit economic–and the main reason more cities are not in a position to make the same decision Lafayette has–is that Lafayette already owns and operates the necessary infrastructure in poles and maintenance crews in order to service its electrical division. It is hard not to suspect that a suggestion this off the mark isn’t motivated in some part by left over resentments from having lost that fight.

You’d think a “Certified Commercial Investment Member” — someone who specializes in commercial real estate investments–would understand that trading a growing revenue-producing asset for a one-shot wasting asset is always a bad idea. Don Bertrand makes the point more succinctly:

Don Bertrand said he’s glad to have a discussion about how to fund roads, but that LUS is the city’s best asset. Bertrand said there are other options to raise funding without giving up a revenue-producing entity like LUS.

“When we’re done, we’ll have roads, but roads don’t produce money,” Bertrand said.

Huval on Cox & Lawsuits; Quiet and Not

Kevin Blanchard has an unusual piece in the Advocate today. Most “news,” hell almost all news, is event-driven. In order for a story to be a “story” it has to be hung on something happening; usually some dramatic change that occurred pretty suddenly.

Today’s article dealing with the players in the fiber-optic telecom utility chess game breaks that mold. It reports on something that isn’t an “event” but should be understood by the public. The article notices the different ways that the incumbents are publicly dealing with a dramatic loss at the polls and it hints at the private cross-currents of professional and personal influence among “influentials.”

I’ve long been an advocate of more “educational” news–news which places a premium on understanding rather than simply describing events. (I try to pursue some of that here.) This is a good think; the article deserves more than the quick glance most readers are likely to accord it.

Public Quiet
The headline “Cox ‘quiet’ since election” keys on remarks made at last night’s Lafayette Public Utility Authority meeting (the LPUA is the city subset of the City-Parish Council and generally meets prior to the Council). Cox has been relatively quiet. But it has joined BellSouth in attempting to take advantage of the situation at the Louisiana Public Service Commission so “quiet” doesn’t quite get it. But it is true that BellSouth has put itself in the way of most of the bad publicity that is to be had from opposing the will of the people of Lafayette.

Why? My suspicion is that Cox thinks it can compete and BellSouth is pretty sure that it cannot. Hence BellSouth is more desperate to prevent municipal competition than its erstwhile ally. Cox has made the decision to keep Lafayette when it shed most of the division that Lafayette was in. Cox, as we’ve remarked repeatedly on these pages, is well positioned to eat BellSouth’s lunch in the coming broadband battle. BellSouth may be well aware that in a full-scale battle for triple or quadruple play customers in Lafayette it will be third ran… At the moment BellSouth’s DSL product competes directly with Cox’s broadband. But it (lists) a slower connection speed and has a smaller customer base. So it competes, against all its monopoly instincts, on price; it is cheaper to buy DSL. But with two broadband alternatives both faster and with LUS committed to driving down the price 20% on its first day of business BellSouth will be both slower and will be deprived of the cheaper price that currently allows it to compete.

BellSouth needs to find a way out. Any way out. For BellSouth, if not for Cox, competition is not a viable alternative. What is true of Lafayette is true, if less urgent, throughout BellSouth’s footprint: it does not want and cannot afford a third, faster, cheaper municipal alternative that reveals it as the last place finisher rather than the cheaper alternative to cable in the expanding broadband market.

That, for my money, is at the basis of Cox’s quiet and BellSouth’s belligerence.

Private Influence
But the public arena is not the only place where cats can be skinned. And the Advocate article gives a small peek into that universe. The article notes the hiring of Karmen Blanco by Cox (a story I posted on earlier) and also highlights the role of Lafayette law firm Perret Doise in BellSouth’s litigation. Perret, it notes, managed Durel’s transition team and Karmen is Kathleen Blanco’s daughter. I have no doubt that both do and will do honorable jobs for their employers. I similarly do not doubt that their ties in the community have something to do with their hire. There are, as sociology texts and traditional wisdom teach us, intricate ties of influence that are professional, personal, and indirect. For instance Perret is also on the board of Our Lady of Fatima elementary school, Karmen’s previous employer. Beyond this story hiring the local public relations firm, Calzone and Associates, and that firm hiring the son of Senator Cravins is not likely be simple coincidence.

Public, professional ties bring private influence into the picture; to say that doesn’t happen is foolish; to say it isn’t intended by the corporations is naive.

It’s all worth watching if you care about the interests of the community as a whole.

There’s quiet and then there is quiet. The fuller story here may be that Cox is learning how to be publicly quiet and privately effective.